A colleague who
works with a major international oil and gas company said “Safety KPIs achieve
the exact opposite of their original intent”. Whilst he was undoubtedly being
provocative to stimulate internal debate, the basis for such a bold statement
can be seen in organisations that have comprehensive reporting mechanisms but
still suffer from major safety incidents.
Safety
performance metrics face an inherent difficulty in that managers have a strong
temptation to make their numbers as good as possible when they report their
performance. This will be true for
safety just as it is for production, sales, financials and any other business
performance metric. Unfortunately, this
tendency is the exact opposite of what is required for good safety performance.
A common theme
in many of the major catastrophic industrial incidents is the fact that warning
signs were there but were not reported. If there is a bias that emphasises the good
and glosses over the bad, there is likelihood that the first indication senior
management get of problems will be too late.
The report of the Baker Panel into the explosion at BP’s Texas City
refinery in 2005 highlighted the fact that clear warning signs were not acted
upon and that filtering and softening of bad news from the plant to BP’s
executive management was a contributor to the lack of priority given to solving
the refinery’s many safety issues.
Trust plays a
big part in the willingness to report bad news upwards. Two factors will be barriers to open and
honest reporting of safety related concerns in an organisation:
·
a history of senior levels reacting
badly to negative news
·
a history of reported problems
being ignored
Both will add
further bias toward reporting good news and hiding bad news.
Therefore, there
is a danger that the bias toward reporting good news will undermine the
objective of safety performance metrics: to provide information to senior managers to
make decisions to improve safety, such as increasing capability and capacity of
staff, increasing capital investment and increasing maintenance budgets.
This bias
towards good news in safety KPIs is aided by the lack of rigour often found in
the measurement of safety metrics.
Whether incidents or near misses (or near hits as they perhaps should be
called) are reported will remain a function of how much importance the whole
organisation places on improving its safety.
It is the organisation’s culture, its values and the behaviours they
drive, that will determine the diligence with which safety metrics are reported.
·
Does the foreman view an injury
to one of his team as an opportunity to learn, for him and the whole
organisation, or something negative to try and avoid reporting if
possible? Are injured employees
encouraged to report to work to ensure that there is no lost time incident to
report?
·
Will the Maintenance manager
accept an unplanned valve overhaul onto his already overloaded critical
maintenance schedule? Or will he try a quick patch and tell Operations
it’s good to go to avoid having to ask for more money to complete critical
work? How will the plant general manager
react to the double impact of missing the critical maintenance KPI and having
to spend more than budgeted to fix the valve?
The use of
targets for certain lagging safety performance indicators, such as lost time
incidents, injuries and losses of containment, requires careful handling for similar
reasons. That they need to be measured is
not in doubt, and is often a legal or regulatory requirement, but the only
morally and logically correct target is zero.
Targets for incidents like injuries or deaths can be used to focus an
organisation in a situation of chronic underperformance, but once performance
is within acceptable, industry average ranges they should replaced with an
ambition for zero.
For safety KPIs
to achieve their intents the following is required:
Management systems: as a
foundation the requirements for safety reporting and KPIs must be clear and
unambiguous to all and there must be some provision to verify the accuracy of
reported information
Trust: all levels of the organisation must trust that
bad news will be received in a constructive way and that it will not lead to a
witch-hunt
Learning and continuous improvement: all incidents and near
misses have to be viewed by the whole organisation as opportunities to learn
Leadership: leaders need
to visibly demonstrate the behaviours that encourage open and honest reporting
of incidents.
Tackling these
areas will set the cultural basis for safety KPIs to achieve their original
intent: visibility of real frontline safety performance that then provides an
accurate picture of the organisation’s risks.
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